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THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THEIR IMPLICIT






The United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission")
recently made substantial revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for organizations (the "Guidelines"), with the changes going into effect
on November 1, 2004.1 In making these revisions, the Commission
promised to create a "new era of corporate compliance" where
organizations would focus "on ethical corporate behavior" and being a
"good corporate citizen.",2  According to the Vice Chairman of the
* An earlier version of this paper won the Best Paper award at the Society for Business
Ethics annual meeting held in Honolulu, HI, in August 2005.
** JD, PhD; Bank One Corporation Assistant Professor of Business Administration,
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan.
JD, MBA; Attorney, Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, LLP.
JD, PhD; The Lindner-Gambal Professor of Business Ethics, The George
Washington University School of Business.
1. The Sentencing Guidelines are not limited to corporate or business entities, but
also apply to "corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions,
trusts, pension funds, unincorporated associations, governments and political
subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANuAL § 8A1.1, cmt. n.1 (2004).
2. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Commission Tightens Requirements
for Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs 1 (May 3, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov
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Commission, the new Guidelines seek to build a "model company" and
stress that "a good corporate citizen must first and foremost operate
ethically."3 To accomplish this, the new Guidelines toughen the criteria
an organization must follow to create an effective compliance program.
Perhaps most importantly, the Guidelines require that organizations
establish an effective compliance and ethics program that promotes an
organizational culture that "encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law. ' 4 Although organizations are
not required to comply with the new Guidelines,5 the Guidelines set the
benchmark for proper corporate conduct. If an organization is
subsequently convicted of a federal crime, its failure to maintain "an
effective compliance and ethics program" may result in the assessment
of harsher penalties against the organization by the court.6
This article reviews the changes to the Guidelines and assesses their
ability to integrate notions of a "good corporate citizen" from law,
management, and ethics. Linking these perspectives, we argue, is the
concept of trust. We characterize trust as consisting of three distinct but
interrelated types of trust that are drawn from the fields of law and
economics, organizational sociology, and philosophy. We argue that
seeking effective compliance and ethics programs would be further
enhanced by an authentic, symbiotic corporate governance strategy that
integrates these three types of trust. This article is a step in the direction
of showing how such a symbiotic integration is now legally mandated,
as well as being a potentially fruitful exercise of interdisciplinary
(follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "May 3, 2004 News Release:
Commission Tightens Requirements for Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs"
hyperlink).
3. Michael Bobelian, New Sentencing Guidelines Cover Corporate Misdeeds,
N.Y. L.J., May 4, 2004, at 1 (quoting Judge Rubin Castillo, Vice Chairman, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n).
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.l(a)(2).
5. See id § 8, introductory cmt.
6. Id.; see id. § 8A1.2(a)(2)(D). In the recent decision of United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), the United States Supreme Court found that if the Guidelines were
"merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate
the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 233. The Court found that "[t]he Guidelines as written,
however, are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges." Id. Based
on this language, the Guidelines are treated as advisory in nature and not binding upon
the judges.
2006] THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 727
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
academic inquiry.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the Guidelines as
originally formulated and the criticisms of the Guidelines in terms of
achieving compliance with the law. Part II discusses the 2004 revisions
of the Guidelines and assesses their potential impact. Part III analyzes
the Guidelines in terms of establishing trust within organizations and
between organizations and society, and considers the role of the law in
fostering such trust. Part IV provides concluding comments.
I. THE "OLD" ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Organizational Criminal Liability and the 1991 Sentencing
Guidelines
An organization is vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its
employees and agents done within the scope of their actual or apparent
authority and with the intent to benefit the organization.7 Thus, an
organization is liable when it knowingly and intentionally authorizes an
agent to act illegally on its behalf (i.e., actual authority) or where a third
party reasonably believes that the agent was expressly authorized to take
7. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2005) (mining
company convicted of violating federal mining health and safety laws); United States v.
Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2003) (corporation convicted of conspiring to
fix prices in the building insulation industry in violation of the Sherman Act); United
States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding the conviction of a
corporation and its officers for conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud and fraudulent sales);
United States v. Aerolite Chrome Corp., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6773 (9th Cir. 1993)
(corporation convicted of knowingly discharging pollutants in violation of pretreatment
standards); United States v. One Parcel of Land, 965 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding the corporation not liable for a stockholder's illegal activities because the
corporation did not have knowledge of the activities); United States v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 1985) (appealing a corporation's conviction for
falsifying logbooks and records); United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730, 737
(5th Cir. 1984) (affirming a corporation's conviction based on illegal activities of its
president); United States v. Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1340, 1358
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (acknowledging that a corporation may be liable for criminal acts of
managerial agents); but see United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676,
684-85 (5th Cir. 1981) (corporation found criminally liable of violating Sherman Act,
even though corporate agents were acquitted).
728 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LAW
the action resulting in the criminal violation (i.e., apparent authority).8
In federal court, criminal liability is imposed regardless of the agent's
position within the organization. 9 Moreover, criminal liability may be
imputed to an organization even where the organization received no
actual benefit from the criminal conduct; the agent must only intend to
bestow some benefit, however minimal, on the organization. '0 Even if
an organization expressly prohibits the illegal conduct and uses its best
efforts to prevent any wrongdoing, it may still be held criminally liable
for its agents' illegal acts." Although an organization may not be
imprisoned, it can be fined, sentenced to probation, ordered to make
restitution, required to issue public notices of conviction and apology, or
to forfeit assets.
12
During the 1980s, Congress perceived that judges were too lenient
in sentencing dangerous criminals and that "glaring disparities" in
sentencing could be "traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law
confers on those judges and parole authorities [that implement] the
sentence."' 3  To have more predictable and determinate sentencing,
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act"). Under
the Act, Congress created an independent agency of the federal judiciary
(the Commission) to develop sentencing guidelines and policy
statements for judges to use when sentencing defendants convicted of
8. Joel M. Androphy et al, General Corporate Criminal Liability, 60 TEX. B. J.
121, 122 ("[A] corporation would be criminally liable for conduct engaged in by the
employee if a third party reasonably believes that the employee was expressly
authorized to take the action resulting in the criminal violation").
9. Spencer R. Fisher, Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 367,
371 (Spring 2004).
10. Id. at 373.
11. Paul J. Desio, Introduction to Organizational Sentencing and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 559, 560 (Fall 2004); see also
United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding a
corporation criminally liable even though agent was expressly advised that the company
did not permit violations of the law); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 142 N.H. 16, 21 (N.H.
1997) (ruling that a corporation can be convicted for actions of its agents even if it
expressly instructed the agents not to engage in the criminal conduct); United States v.
Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A] corporation may be liable for acts of
its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but ... the existence of
such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee
in fact acted to benefit the corporation").
12. Desio, supra note 11, at 559.
13. S. REP. No. 97-307 at 956 (1981).
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federal crimes. The Act's primary purpose was to limit federal judges'
discretion in handling indeterminate sentencing under the guise of
ensuring that the "ends of justice" were properly and equally satisfied.1 4
In 1991, the Commission promulgated rules for the sentencing of
organizations convicted of committing federal felonies and Class A
misdemeanors, which are located in Chapter Eight of the Sentencing
Guidelines.15 With respect to organizational crime, the Commission
adopted a "carrot and stick" approach. The Guidelines reward
organizations that create an "effective compliance program' ' 16 to prevent
and detect violations of the law through mitigation of prescribed fines or
sentences and by severely punishing organizations that are involved in,
condoned, or tolerated criminal activity. 7 As originally adopted, the
Guidelines define an "effective program to prevent and detect violations
of law" as a "program that has been reasonably designed, implemented,
and enforced so as to prevent and detect the instant offense .... ."" The
1991 Guidelines provide that the "hallmark" of an effective program is
"that the organization exercise due diligence in seeking to prevent and
detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents."' 19 "Due
diligence" requires "at a minimum" that the organization adopt a
compliance program meeting the following requirements:
1) Establishes standards and procedures which are "reasonably
capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct"
2) Appoints "high-level personnel" to oversee the program
3) Ensures that authority in the program is not given to those
that have "a propensity to engage in criminal conduct"
14. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005); see also Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov (follow "Public
Information" hyperlink; follow "Speeches" hyperlink; then follow "American Bar
Association Annual Meeting, August 9, 2003" hyperlink) (revised Aug. 14, 2003).
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2004).
16. Id. § 8B2.1.
17. Elkan Abramowitz and Barry A. Bohrer, A Decade with the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2002, at 3; Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing
Commission Amendments Encourage a New Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 565, 567 (Fall 2004).
18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(k) (1991) (amended
2004).
19. Id.
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4) Communicates the program's requirements to all employees
and agents
5) Ensures compliance through monitoring and auditing
6) Enforces the program through "appropriate disciplinary
mechanisms"
7) Once a violation has occurred, updates the program to
ensure effectiveness
20
An organization's failure to satisfy these seven minimum
requirements results in increased sanctions for criminal misconduct. As
the Commission's chairperson explained: "[t]hese guidelines provide
incentives for voluntary reporting and cooperation but punish an
organization's failure to self-police. 2 1  An organization that
incorporates all seven requirements, self reports, cooperates, and accepts
responsibility for the illegal conduct of its employees may receive up to
a 95% reduction in federal fines.22 In contrast, organizations that fail to
comply with these requirements may be subject to a 400% increase in
their federal fines.23 The fines imposed on an organization for violating
federal law can be substantial. In 2001, the average fine for
organizations was $2,154,929 (ten times greater than in 1995) and the
median fine was $60,000 (twice the amount in 1995). 24
Even more important than sentence reduction, the presence or
absence of an effective compliance program can determine whether or
not prosecutors will initiate criminal proceedings against an
organization. An example of the presence or absence of a compliance
program effecting proceedings can be observed from the fact that,
approximately between 2000 to 2004, of the 377 organizations
20. Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(k)(1)- (7) (1991) (amended 2004).
21. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Convenes
Organizational Guidelines Ad Hoc Advisory Group I (Feb. 21, 2002),
http://www.ussc.gov (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "February 21,
2002 News Release: Sentencing Commission Convenes Organizational Guidelines Ad
Hoc Advisory Group" hyperlink).
22. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 567.
23. Id.
24. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP ON
ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 26 (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrp.htm (follow "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: October 7, 2003" hyperlink) [hereinafter
ADVISORY REPORT].
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sentenced under the guidelines, only sixteen had any type of compliance
program. 2' This can be compared with the observation that, from 1993
to 2001, 812 organizations were sentenced under the guidelines, but only
three of those organizations received a sentence reduction for having an
effective compliance program.26
B. The Impact of the 1991 Guidelines
The Guidelines have led to significant changes by corporations.
Compliance programs are now standard practice, with over 90% of large
corporations having an ethics code.27 The Ethics Officers Association,
founded in 1992 with only a handful of members, now has over 1,000
members.28
Despite the widespread use of compliance programs, critics have
challenged their effectiveness as a regulatory measure for several
different reasons. The primary basis for many of these criticisms is the
fear of cosmetic compliance; firms adopting only the appearance of a
compliance program. According to one analysis, these codes are
commonly viewed by employees "as public relations vehicles or 'just a
piece of paper.' ' 29  Other studies found that these "codes" were
"unrealistic and failed to address practical management issues," and,
thus, were largely ignored by employees. 30 According to Paul Fiorelli, a
member of the Commission's Advisory Group, since the adoption of the
Guidelines, organizations developed "token" or "paper" compliance
programs by merely "checking the boxes" to comply with the seven
25. F. Joseph Warin and Michael D. Billok, Navigating the Legal Requirements of
Internal Compliance Programs, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Nov./Dec.
2004, at 13-14.
26. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 26; see infra notes 70-74 and
accompanying text (discussing the Thompson Memorandum, infra note 35).
27. Janet S. Adams et al., Codes of Ethics as Signals of Ethical Behavior, 29 J.
Bus. ETHICS 199, 199 (2001).
28. Ethics and Compliance Officers Association, About the EOA,
http://www.theecoa.org/AboutEOA.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
29. JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY § 7:14, at 7-30
(West Pub. 2003).
30. Id.
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minimum requirements of the Guidelines.3
William Laufer identifies the "paradox of compliance," where a
moral hazard problem results from firms using compliance programs
simply as insurance against prosecution.32 Due to this "insurance," firms
take less care to prevent wrongdoing, which may result in more
wrongful behavior.33 Laufer also identifies a problem of "reverse
whistle-blowing., 34  While conducting investigations under the
Guidelines, prosecutors show leniency towards firms for working with
the prosecutors and providing them with information. 35 However, this
often results in senior managers providing prosecutors with information
to implicate lower-level managers and protect the senior managers from
liability (as well as preventing a more thorough investigation of the
crime). 36 Although that may be fair when the lower-level manager is to
blame, it creates problems when the firm has a culture of encouraging
(and perhaps even rewarding) such wrongful behavior from its
employees.37
The reverse whistle blowing phenomenon identified by Laufer
shows how, in practice, the Guidelines can be used in a manner that goes
directly against their intended purpose.38 The Guidelines were, in part, a
recognition that illegal corporate behavior typically cannot be fully
explained by the "character flaws" of one individual committing the
offense.3 9 The Guidelines were enacted to recognize the culpability of
31. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 567.
32. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1405-07 (1999).
33. Id.
34. William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of
Favors, 87 IOwA L. REV. 643, 648-49, 657-63 (2002).
35. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to
Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporateguidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (discussing the various issues
prosecutors should take into account when "determining whether to bring charges, and
negotiating plea agreements."); see also Laufer, supra note 34, at 654 (advising
corporations of the benefits of embracing a prosecutor rather than "rejecting the
prosecutorial overtures.").
36. Laufer, supra note 34, at 657-58.
37. See Laufer, supra note 34, at 659-62.
38. See generally Laufer, supra note 32.
39. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1994, at 106.
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organizations in encouraging and influencing employee misconduct.40
There is also a general concern that the compliance programs
adopted in response to the Guidelines are inefficient.4' That is, they
create costs for firms that are not justified by the benefits they provide to
society.42 For example, firms that genuinely seek to comply with the
law must adopt the required compliance program - regardless of the
other methods they use to ensure ethical behavior - to ensure they
receive sentencing mitigation under the Guidelines if something does go
wrong. 43 For other firms, simply forcing them to adopt a compliance
program creates significant costs, but does little to prevent misconduct if
implemented improperly.
Simply adopting a compliance program with the aforementioned
seven factors does not assure a successful program; instead it depends
on how the company approaches the program. Paine argued that firms
could adopt either a compliance-based or an integrity-based approach."
Under a compliance-based program, firms typically over-emphasize
threat of detection and punishment for misconduct, which can be
counter-productive if employees view the program as simply a tool to
achieve leniency from prosecutors and to protect top management from
blame.45  An integrity-based approach, on the other hand, seeks to
develop legitimacy with the employees and focuses on internally
developed organizational values.46 Under this approach, obeying the
40. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-15; see Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M.
Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development,
Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.
205, 210-11,227 (1993).
41. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92, 511-14 (2003); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with the
Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 117 (2002) ("Monitoring-based systems have
unexpectedly serious (and probably immeasurable) costs, which society should not
impose without strong reason.").
42. Krawiec, supra note 41, at 489.
43. Id. at 492-93.
44. Paine, supra note 39, at 111.
45. Id.; G.R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, Compliance and Values Oriented
Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees' Attitudes and Behavior, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q.
315 (1999).
46. Paine, supra note 39, at 111.
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law "is viewed as a positive aspect of organizational life, rather than an
unwelcome constraint imposed by external authorities. 47
The sum of these criticisms is the idea that it is not simply the
adoption of a compliance program that matters, but the culture (using the
term loosely)48 of the organization that is the most important determinate
for influencing employees' behavior (either positively or negatively).
Although a good deal of ink has been spilt on the Enron case, a brief
review and analysis is useful to demonstrate both the importance of
corporate culture and the problems with the 1991 Guidelines.49
As is well known, Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001
with debts over $100 billion, amid allegations that it artificially boosted
profits totaling over $1 billion.50 Enron, however, had a model code of
ethics51 that likely satisfied the seven requirements of the Guidelines.
The vision statement in Enron's Code of Ethics was "R.I.C.E.," which
stood for "Respect, Integrity, Communication, and Excellence. 52
Enron's code "prohibited its employees from having financial or a
management role in Enron's special purpose entities unless the chairman
and the CEO determined that such participation would not adversely
affect the best interests of the company. 5 3 However, Enron's directors
waived the company's code of ethics in June 1999 to allegedly permit
Enron's former CFO Andrew Fastow, and former Enron employee
Michael Koppers, to run and financially benefit from Enron's special
47. Id.
48. For a more complete discussion of ethical culture and ethical climate, see Linda
Klebe Trevino et al., The Ethical Context in Organizations: Influences on Employee
Attitudes and Behaviors, 8 Bus. ETHICS Q. 447 (1998).
49. For a complete, book-length description of Enron's culture from an insider, see
MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003). For an insider story on the role of corporate culture in the
ethical failures that brought down another highly-esteemed company, see BARBARA LEY
TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE
FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (2003).
50. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 49; see also BBC News, Enron Files
for Bankruptcy (Dec. 3, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1688550.stm.
51. Corporate Ethics Training: Top-to-Bottom Training, Employee 'Ethics Help
Line' are Key to Corporate Culture of Ethics, CHARTWELL'S BEST PRACTICES FOR
UTILITIES AND ENERGY COMPANIES (Chartwell Inc., Atlanta, GA, Sept. 2002), at 141.
52. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 567.
53. Raphael S. Grunfeld, Enforcing a Written Code of Ethics, Well-Ingrained
Guidelines Given Higher Priority, Encourage Executives to Do the Right Thing, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 18, 2002, at S3.
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purpose entities.5 4 In fact, three times in a twelve-month period, Enron's
board of directors waived the code of ethics to permit transactions with
its special purpose entities.55 More importantly, the values of the vision
statement appeared to be exactly opposite of the true culture that existed
there.56
Enron had developed a culture of pushing the law to the limit and
encouraging the discovery of loopholes to benefit the firm. As one
commentator on Enron's culture noted, "law and rules were viewed as
hindering innovation, creativity, and the entrepreneurial spirit rather than
being a necessary foundation for them.,5 7 For example, Enron's special
purpose entities pushed the limits of technical compliance with the
General Accounting Principles (GAP), which permitted Enron to
mislead investors and creditors by avoiding disclosure of certain assets
and liabilities.58 Likewise, at all levels of the organization, employees
were apparently rewarded for the results they achieved, without concern
for how those results were achieved. Furthermore, conflicts of interest
were seemingly practiced at the upper levels of management, who did
little to discourage such practices at lower levels. For example, in 1997,
Enron acquired a company co-owned by the son of Chairman Kenneth
Lay.59 In addition, employees claim they were encouraged to use a
travel agency operated by Lay's sister.60
The payouts for success - however it was achieved - were
54. Greg Farrell, Enron Law Firm Called Accounting Practices 'Creative', USA
TODAY, Jan. 15, 2002, at D1.
55. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 578.
56. See Press Release, Enron, Statement of Human Rights Principles,
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/responsibility/human-rights-statement.html
(last visited Feb. 26 2006). See generally Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 578; Lynne L.
Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron 's Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 45-46 (2003) (explaining the culture that existed at Enron).
57. Dallas, supra note 56, at 45.
58. Dallas, supra note 56, at 47; Thoughts on Enron: What Happened, Why, and
How It Can Be Avoided Again: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego School of Law). ,
59. Anita Raghavan et al., How Enron Bosses Created a Culture of Pushing Limits,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2002, at Al.
60. Id.
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tremendous. For the most part, Enron removed seniority-based pay
scales and replaced them with a twice-yearly performance-based bonus
system where all employees were ranked against each other.6 A single
committee of 20 managers that required unanimous consent did the
performance reviews. This caused employees to fear raising any
concerns about company practices because upsetting just one committee
member could mean a poor performance review.62 Enron's reward
system gave significantly higher payouts to the top individual
performers, which worked against teamwork and encouraged individuals
to refuse to share information, and, in some cases, resulted in employees
stealing information from each other.63 Likewise, it created tremendous
pressures to continually improve earnings, as that was what was
rewarded. This encouraged managers to push the boundaries of
accounting practices farther and farther every year.64
A checks-and-balances system was either absent or seriously
flawed. One commentator noted that Enron was missing "adult
supervision. 65  New employees, some straight out of undergraduate
business programs, could make multi-million dollar decisions without
approval. In other cases, recent MBAs were appointed to the risk-
management group and were expected to review proposals written by
the same senior managers that wrote their performance evaluations.66 In
addition, the risk and control group reported to Enron Chief Operating
Officer Jeffrey Skilling and not to the board of directors.67
Fiorelli facetiously asked, "[a]ssume that Enron successfully
emerges from bankruptcy. Should it qualify for reductions from federal
criminal fines because it had an 'ethics' program?, 68  The Enron
example clearly shows the limits of the 1991 Guidelines approach. For
example, even with a model code of ethics, how the organization
rewards employees and controls risks can have a negative, and
significantly stronger, impact on employee behavior. As Laufer argued,
61. Dallas, supra note 56, at 51.
62. John A. Byrne, The Environment was Ripe for Abuse, Bus. WK., Feb. 25, 2002,
at 118.
63. Id.; Dallas, supra note 56, at 50.
64. Byrne, supra note 62, at 118; Dallas, supra note 57, at 49-50.
65. Byrne, supra note 62, at 118.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 565.
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the presence of a compliance program may actually lead some firms to
further encourage a culture that supports wrongful behavior. 69 The next
section considers the reaction of the Sentencing Commission to such
problems.
II. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group and the Call for an Increased Focus on
Ethics
Enron and the various other ethics scandals at the start of the
century led to a closer look at compliance programs. In January 2003,
Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a Memorandum to
all U.S. Attorneys requiring them to "determine whether a corporation's
compliance program is merely a 'paper program' or whether it was
designed and implemented in an effective manner., 70 If the compliance
program was merely a "paper program," Mr. Thompson instructed U.S.
Attorneys to strongly consider this factor in evaluating whether to
initiate criminal prosecution against an organization.71
Prior to that, in 2002, in response to the ten-year anniversary of the
Guidelines, the Commission formed an ad hoc advisory group (the
"Advisory Group") to review the general effectiveness of the Guidelines
for organizations. 72  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also suggested such a
review.73 The Commission conducted a public hearing and solicitation
of comments as part of this review.74
During the hearings, various commentators urged the Advisory
Group to include "ethics" as a requirement under the Guidelines. Dov
69. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
70. Thompson Memo, supra note 35.
71. Id.
72. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Convenes
Organizational Guidelines Ad Hoc Advisory Group (Feb. 21, 2002),
http://www.ussc.gov (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "February 21,
2002, News Release: Sentencing Commission Convenes Organizational Guidelines Ad
Hoc Advisory Group" hyperlink).
73. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
74. Public Hearings Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Nov. 14, 2002),
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrp.htm; ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
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Seidman, Chief Executive Officer of Legal Research Network, stated,
"by requiring only that an organization promote a culture that
encourages a commitment to compliance with the law, I believe the
advisory group stopped one step short.... [Y]ou can't have a culture of
compliance unless you also have a culture of ethics., 75 Seidman went
on to state his concern that, if ethics was not addressed, then the
Guidelines would "foster the same type of corporate cultures that
allowed individuals to seek out loopholes in the law." 76 Similarly, Bill
Lytton, former counsel to Presidents Reagan and Bush, testified that the
overarching goal in amending the Guidelines should be to "provid[e]
and foster [an] atmosphere where people who want to do the right thing
are encouraged to do it and people who don't want to do the right thing
are found out and prevented from doing it."'77 Stuart Gillman, President
of the Ethics Resource Center, testified that the Guidelines must
"encourage organizations to foster ethical cultures, to ensure focus on
the intent of legal and regulatory requirements as opposed to mere
technical compliance that can potentially circumvent the intent or spirit
of law or regulation. 78
After these hearings, the Advisory Group concluded that the
"effectiveness of compliance programs could be enhanced if, in addition
to due diligence in maintaining compliance programs, organizations also
took steps to build cultures that encouraged employee commitment to
75. Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 25 (Mar. 17, 2004)
(testimony of Dov L. Seidman, Chief Executive Officer, Legal Research Network),
http://www.ussc.gov (follow "Public Hearing Testimony" hyperlink; then follow
"Transcript of Proceedings: United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing
(Washington, DC - March 17, 2004)" hyperlink).
76. News Release, Legal Research Network, Sentencing Corporate America:
Ethical or Not? How Does the Low-Key Independent Government Agency Set
Sentencing Guidelines for Individuals and Corporations? LRN CEO Testifies Criteria
Should Include Ethics (Mar. 17, 2004), http://www.lrn.com/news/news/releases/
sentencingcorporate.php.
77. Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm 'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 40-41 (Nov. 14, 2002) (testimony of Bill
Lytton, Executive Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Tyco International),
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phl 1_02/plenary2.pdf.
78. Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm 'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 10 (Nov. 14, 2002) (testimony of Dr. Stuart
Gillman, President, Ethics Resource Center), http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phll02/
plenary 1.pdf.
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compliance." 9 As a result, the Commission modified the Guidelines to
require organizations to specifically establish a "compliance and ethics
program.' 80 To have an "effective compliance and ethics program," an
organization must both "exercise due diligence to prevent and detect
criminal conduct" and "otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law." 
81
In its commentary, the Advisory Report stated that:
[O]rganizational culture, in this context, has come to be defined as
the shared set of norms and beliefs that guide individual and
organizational behavior. These norms and beliefs are shaped by
leadership of the organization, are often expressed as shared values
or guiding principles, and are reinforced by various systems and
procedures throughout the organization.
82
One such value is "law compliance." 3  However, the Advisory
Report sends conflicting messages on what is required beyond
compliance. In one place, the Advisory Report notes the "emphasis on
ethics and values" and states that it is consistent with an emphasis on
"honest and ethical conduct" found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The Advisory Report mentions that the new emphasis is also consistent
with recent changes to the listing requirements of the New York Stock
Exchange and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.84
On the other hand, the new Guidelines simply define a "compliance
and ethics program" as a "program designed to prevent and detect
criminal conduct. ' 85 The Advisory Report notes that "[a]t a minimum,
such cultures will promote compliance with the law. To the extent that
they encourage further ethical conduct, the organization and the
community will benefit in additional ways. 86 The Advisory Report also
states:
79. ADvisoRY REPORT, supra note 24, at 51.
80. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2004).
81. Id.
82. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 52.
83. Id. at51.
84. Id. at 52.
85. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1, cmt. n. 1.
86. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 52-53.
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It is important to note, however, that this recommendation will not
impose upon organizations anything more than the law requires, nor
will it conflict with industry-specific regulatory requirements. It is
also intended to avoid requiring prosecutors to litigate and judges to
determine whether an organization has a good "set of values" or
appropriate "ethical standards," subjects which are very difficult, if
not impossible, to evaluate in an objective, consistent manner.9
7
Despite these seemingly conflicting statements, it does appear that
the Guidelines encourage judges and prosecutors to look for evidence of
an ethical corporate culture and not simply to look for an effective
compliance program. The Guidelines and Advisory Report clearly
specify that an effective compliance program requires a firm to both
"exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct" and
develop an ethical culture. 88 While the goal is compliance with the law,
these are two separate but complementary means of achieving that end.
The Advisory Group recognizes that the new Guidelines have "the dual
objectives of reasonable prevention and positive culture., 89 Although
the Advisory Report indicates that the Commission is not imposing
duties on the organization beyond what the law requires, its chosen
means clearly requires firms to comply with the "spirit of the law" and
not just the "letter of the law." For example, the Advisory Report states
that ethical organizational cultures are "driven by values that go beyond
aiming for the lowest possible standards of compliance." 90
The minimum requirements for establishing an effective
compliance program and ethical culture are based on the seven
requirements of the 1991 Guidelines, but include some significant
changes. The next section reviews those changes.
B. Amendments to the Requirements for an Effective Program.
First, the Guidelines created a new definition of compliance
"[s]tandards and procedures" (Step 1), as "standards of conduct and
internal controls that are reasonably capable of reducing the likelihood
of criminal conduct."9' This is consistent with changes to Step 7 that
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id. at 53; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.l(a)(1).
89. ADVIsORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 55.
90. Id. at 54.
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n. 1 (2004).
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require corporations to continually assess the risk of criminal conduct
occurring.92 Previously, organizations were only required to update their
programs after a violation had occurred. Under the new guidelines,
firms are responsible for updating their programs on a continuing basis
to protect against the risk of violations. 93 Together, these changes
require more than merely adopting a manual that sets forth ethical
guidelines for the organization. Instead, organizations must continually
refine their programs to address changing circumstances and new risks.
According to the Commission, "standards of conduct and internal
controls are essential aspects of effective compliance programs and...
these measures should be developed, implemented, and evaluated in
terms of their impact on reducing the likelihood of violations of the
law. 94
Second, the Commission sought to clarify leadership
responsibilities. 95 In the prior Guidelines, the role of leadership was
only addressed by requiring that a high level official oversee the
program (Step 2).96 Based on its investigation, the Advisory Group
found that a key lesson from the corporate scandals was the lack of
"specification of the roles of organizational leadership in the
organizational sentencing guidelines. ' 97  Accordingly, the new
Guidelines sought to correct this problem in a few different ways. First,
the new Guidelines require that the "governing authority" (i.e., the board
of directors) must be "knowledgeable" about the compliance and ethics
program (which includes information on the compliance risks facing the
firm and the programs installed to combat those risks) and be
"proactive" in evaluating, monitoring, and managing this program.98
Second, the Guidelines require that "high-level personnel" must
"ensure" 99 that the organization has an effective compliance plan.100
92. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(7).
93. Id.
94. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 56.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(k)(2)-(3)
(2001) (amended 2004).
97. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 57.
98. Id. at 60-61; U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
99. U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2. I(b)(2)(B).
100. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 60-61.
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"[H]igh-level personnel" is limited to such persons as "a director; an
executive officer; an individual in charge of a major business or
functional unit of the organization, such as law, sales, administration, or
finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership interest.
10
'
Third, those individuals with "day-to-day operational responsibility"
such as a Chief Ethics Officer must "be given adequate resources,
appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority."'' 0 2 Together, these
provisions reflect the philosophy that a positive organizational culture is
established by requiring all levels of the organization - the top, middle,
and bottom - to be active in promoting the appropriate "organizational
tone.'
103
Third, the Commission made it clear that ethics and compliance
training (Step 4) was mandatory (that is, simply disseminating
information on the program is not sufficient) and that all employees,
including the board of directors and high-level employees, must receive
training.10 4 In addition, the Advisory Report indicates that educating
employees about compliance requirements would not be enough, and
that organizations must also motivate all employees to comply.'0 5 This
is consistent with changes to Step 6, which provides that organizations
should not only punish those that violate the ethics and compliance
program, but they should also provide positive incentives for individuals
to comply. 0 6 This is a continuation of the Commission's philosophy on
using a "carrot and stick" to compel changes in an organization.'t°
Fourth, the Guidelines require the program to include a system that
101. Id. at 62.
102. Id. at 60-61. An interesting issue that is not addressed or discussed in any of
the materials relating to the adoption of the Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
is the potential liability associated with serving as the Chief Ethics Officer. It is
possible that a shareholder, member, or creditor of the organization could, in certain
circumstances, bring an action against a Chief Ethics Officer for acting negligently in
determining whether the organization is acting illegally. Of course, this potential
exposure may provide an incentive to the Chief Ethics Officer to vigorously audit and
enforce compliance with the Sentencing Guidelines.
103. Fiorelli, supra note 17, at 582.
104. Id. at 583.
105. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 71.
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (b)(6) (2004).
107. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 40, at 227-28, 237-38; supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
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allows employees to report misconduct and seek guidance without fear
of retaliation (Step 5). °8 The prior version was worded such that these
systems were not mandatory. 09 Based on the testimony and evidence
provided to the Advisory Group, there were two common problems
plaguing companies who were ultimately convicted of a crime. The first
problem was that employees or management knew or suspected that
illegal conduct was occurring within the organization but did not report
it because they feared "some sort of retribution" or that their jobs would
be in jeopardy."0 As a result, employees remained silent, thereby
allowing the illegal conduct to continue."' The second problem was
that most organizations lacked any mechanism to allow employees to
report wrongful conduct confidentially.1 2 The lack of confidentiality
and fear of retaliation were the major road blocks to allowing employees
to report an organization's criminal conduct. Based on the Advisory
Group's investigation, it found that 44% of all non-management
employees do not report the misconduct they observe." 3  Of those
individuals, 57% failed to report because they felt that such a report
would not be kept confidential, 41% feared retaliation from their
manager, and 30% believed that co-workers would retaliate for any
report of wrongdoing."' The purpose of this provision is to foster an
organizational culture that promotes, not penalizes, employees who
report violations of the law.
Overall, the new Guidelines require firms to be more proactive in
designing and updating their programs. Organizations are also
encouraged to consider not only the risk of illegal activities by
employees, but also ethical lapses." 5
108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5).
109. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 72.
110. Public Hearing Before the US. Sentencing Comm 'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 14 (Nov. 14, 2002) (testimony of Deborah




113. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 78 (citing Ethics Resource Center, 2003
National Business Ethics Survey (2003), available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/
nbes2003/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006)).
114. Id.
115. Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Compliance Programs 2.0: The Next Generation in
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C. An Assessment of the Amendments
The most important question, of course, is whether the Guidelines
will make a difference in improving the behavior of organizations. Will
the Guidelines continue as simply being "insurance" against
prosecution, or will they actually prevent misconduct? From the
prosecutor's perspective, the Guidelines may not have changed much, as
the prosecutors likely already considered many of the same factors for
an effective program now formalized into law when deciding whether or
not to prosecute a firm. 1 6 From the organization's side, however, there
will likely be a significant impact, as firms will be encouraged by in-
house counsel and consultants to update their programs. Furthermore,
due to the shift to a more punitive approach to corporate crime in other
areas, the Guidelines will be even more important.' 17 The impact of
these changes also will be amplified by directors' duties under the
Caremark case. 11 Under Caremark, directors may be in breach of their
fiduciary duties if they do not consider the opportunities for a reduced
sentence under the Guidelines." 9
The changes to the Guidelines to achieve the Commission's goal -
to encourage firms to adopt programs that actually work - are
supported by research from management scholars. 20 Although most
compliance programs have characteristics of both compliance-based and
integrity-based programs, the most successful programs are those where
the characteristics of an integrity-based approach dominate.'2' One of
the most important factors is that of management commitment. When
management demonstrates a commitment to ethics, then all members of
the organization are more likely to view ethics as a key organizational
Compliance Programs, THE CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Nov./Dec. 2004, at 10-11.
116. Thompson Memo, supra note 35; see also Frank 0. Bowman III, Drifting
Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of
Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671
(2004).
117. Bowman, supra note 116, at 672.
118. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ct. Chan. 1996).
119. Id. at961.
120. For a general review of the research in this area, see LINDA KLEBE TREVINO &
GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVES (2003).
121. See Paine, supra note 37.
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value and take legal compliance initiatives more seriously. 2 2 The new
Guidelines expand the roles of top management by requiring them to
participate in training. The Guidelines also create a duty for top
management to ensure the effectiveness of the program.
23
Commitment means more than just enforcing a program, however.
As with the 1991 Guidelines, employees may still view compliance
programs as attempts to protect management.124  Management
commitment includes actions beyond the establishment of the program.
For example, researchers have also identified the following factors as
important for a successful, integrity-based program: fair treatment of
employees, open discussions of ethics in the organization, and rewarding
ethical behavior (such as an employee reporting the unethical behavior
of a co-worker) and not just self-interest. 25
Requiring organizations to treat their employees "fairly" is likely
beyond the ability of the law to monitor and enforce consistently.
However, the Guidelines do take steps towards creating an environment
for an open discussion of ethics by requiring ongoing training and the
involvement of top management in training. 1 6  In addition, the
Guidelines specifically require organizations to provide positive
incentives for ethical behavior - another component of an effective
integrity-based compliance program.127 With the use of reward systems,
the organization is more likely to involve its Human Resources
department, which brings a different perspective to the compliance
program than the Legal department. 28  According to Trevino and
Weaver, the involvement of a Human Resources department goes a long
way towards developing an integrity-based program. 129
There are, of course, limits to what the law can accomplish. For
example, if the goal is to develop an integrity-based program (where
employees willingly adopt the values of legal compliance and ethics and
122. Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What
Works and What Hurts, 41 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999).
123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B.2.1(b) (2004).
124. See Laufer, supra note 34, at 652.
125. Trevino et al., supra note 48, at 447; Trevino et al., supra note 122, at 131.
126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B.2. 1(b)(4)(A).
127. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6).
128. TREvINO and WEAVER, supra note 120, at 146-47.
129. Id. at 97.
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participate in developing the rules/norms of the organization), do the
Guidelines actually work against that goal by developing even more
stringent guidelines? Can these external inducements "force" a
company to create an ethical organizational culture? Likewise, how
should the law balance between giving firms the flexibility to develop
integrity-based programs and mandating best-practices, which can stifle
experimentation on what works best for the firm's particular situation?
In the next section, we develop the idea that the new Guidelines can
be seen as an attempt to restore trust in free market systems and in
corporations in particular. The new Guidelines, along with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 130 changes to Securities and Exchange Commission
regulations,' 3 ' and other government actions, 32 are an attempt to
develop trust between corporations and the public. For the Guidelines to
be effective, however, there must also be trust within the organization,
as seen generally by the importance of fairness in an organization for a
successful compliance program. The next section develops the concept
of trust in that context for the purpose of both providing management
with guidance in how to comply with the Guidelines, as well as helping
to understand what role the law can play in creating ethical
organizations.
III. THE 2004 AMENDMENTS AND PUBLIC TRUST IN BUSINESS
A. Hard Conviction Real Confidence, and Good Faith
There are multiple ways to attempt to restore trust. One way to
accomplish the re-creation of public trust is to insist upon stricter legal
requirements. This is the approach taken by the Guidelines and its
amendments,"' as well as a myriad of other mechanisms including
Sarbanes-Oxley,'34 for example. Another approach is one that is
130. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
131. 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5118 (Jan. 31, 2003) (including disclosure requirements on
codes of ethics).
132. See Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks ": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277 (2004) (reviewing reforms at all three branches of
government that are aimed at reducing corporate corruption).
133. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2004).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 7201.
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typically taken by schools of management, both from social scientific
and normative perspectives, in which trust derives from the practice of
certain virtues, whether production of quality products or simple
honesty, and thereby creates social capital.'35 Still a third approach
relies more motivationally on the kinds of passions that engender ethical
behavior. This approach depends on the development of trust through
passionate commitment to being a certain kind of person or company.
Rather than generally suggesting that corporations need to restore public
trust, it may be useful for corporations following the 2004
Amendments 36 to conceive of their task as fostering three related but
distinct kinds of trust. One could characterize them as Hard Conviction,
Real Confidence, and Good Faith.
Hard Conviction concerns how to make sure that people do what
they are supposed to do. This is the approach to trust most closely
associated with the field of law and economics. Under this approach,
trust is a rational, calculated choice based on deterrence and cost-benefit
analyses. 3 7 An individual can be trusted if the situation is such that it is
in his or her own self-interest to act in a way consistent with being
trustworthy. 138 For example, I can be trusted not to steal from you if
there are sufficiently strong penalties for theft. '9
The initial reaction of Congress to the scandals of Enron,
Worldcom, and Global Crossing 140 was to increase the penalties for
fraudulent behavior through new crimes and enhanced penalties for
135. See generally LaRue Tone Hosmer, Trust: The Connecting Link Between
Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics, 20 ACADEMY OF MGMT. REv. 379
(1995) (reviewing the different approaches to trust within management scholarship).
136. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2004).
137. Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging
Perspectives, Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REv. OF PSYCHOL. 569, 572 (1999).
138. Id.
139. Some argue that this is an ironic view of the term "trust," as "trust is the very
opposite of control." Fernando Flores & Robert C. Solomon, Creating Trust, 8 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 205, 206, 226 (1998). In the area of corporate law, some view the law as
providing a necessary "backstop" against which trust can develop. Larry E. Ribstein,
Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553, 574-75 (2001) (discussing the works of Lawrence
Mitchell and William Bratton).
140. For a review of these scandals, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv.
915, 923-36 (2003).
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existing crimes.'14  In large part, most of what these turn-of-the-century
scandals were about was a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather than looking
out for the interests of shareholders, executives were more interested in
their own personal well-being, even at the expense of their
shareholders. 14' The duty of loyalty and the duty of care are well-
established legal constraints regulating the behavior of directors of
corporations. 43  So too, now, the aforementioned provisions of the
Guidelines provide legal constraints regulating the behavior of directors
of corporations.'" In the past, other laws have resulted in constraints on
corporate behavior, such as those related to securities fraud, 145 unsafe
working practices, 146 unsafe products, 47 and collusion. 48 The harshness
of this approach is that there are clear legal punishments if a company
does not implement what is called an "effective" program. It may be
that internally-driven programs tap more deeply into employee values
than do externally driven ones, 149 but laws help to ensure the public that
141. For a critical review of this deterrence response, see, e.g., Michael A. Perino,
Enron's Legislative Aftermath.: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671 (2002) (arguing that economic
theory suggests that increasing deterrence will have little impact on executives'
behavior); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 36-44 (2002)
(outlining the costs associated with increased liability and regulation); Jennifer S.
Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1535 (2002) (reviewing evidence that penalty
enhancements will not deter white collar crime).
142. See David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a
Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 88 (2003) (noting that Andrew Fastow, the
Chief Financial Officer of Enron, engaged in transactions that benefited himself at the
expense of Enron shareholders). For a complete discussion of Andrew Fastow's self-
dealing at Enron and whether or not it was a breach of the duty of loyalty, see William
W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other
Stakeholders? Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275,
1309-14 (2002).
143. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 273-386 (2000) (providing a
thorough review of directors' and officers' duties of care and loyalty).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2. 1(b)(2)(B) (2004).
145. Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2001).
146. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651-677 (2000).
147. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2084 (2000).
148. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (2000).
149. See Paine, supra note 39, at 110-13.
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their voice is also heard by companies.
The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect
an attempt to reinforce Hard Conviction in order to assure compliance. 50
The route they take, however, interestingly relies on softer notions of
culture and ethics because of a belief that reliance on coercion will not
be sufficient to achieve corporate compliance. 5 Thus, conceptually, in
addition to Hard Conviction, the Amendments have added what might
be called Real Confidence.
Real Confidence is what most people think of when they hear the
term "trust," at least in business. 5 2 Real Confidence is about people
living up to the promises they made, being honest, treating others fairly,
and producing products and services that are of high enough quality to
satisfy customers.' 53 Whereas Hard Conviction concerns a conscious
consideration of the risk of punishment, Real Confidence is about social
relationships. 5
4
The academic foundations of Real Confidence lie in studies of
social capital by sociologists, political scientists, and, increasingly,
management scholars.'55 Social capital derives from the work of
scholars such as Robert Putnam. 5 6 Drawing on metaphors of financial
capital' 57 and human capital, 5 8 these scholars look at the network of
relationships that occur in certain kinds of communities that allow
150. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.10 (2004).
151. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-64 and accompanying text for an explanation of Real
Confidence.
153. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM
(W.W. Bartley ed., 1988) (arguing from a strictly economic basis, the market works
best when there is trust between actors in the economy).
154. See Kramer, supra note 137, at 573.
155. Id.
156. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (discussing the power
of social networks in creating a happy, well educated, healthy and safe society). See
also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
SOC. 95 (1998); Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360
(1973).
157. See PUTNAM, supra note 156, at 18-20 (referring to the financial savings,
resources, and leverage that can be utilized in productive capacities).
158. See id. (referring to the capabilities of individuals that can be utilized in
productive capacities, such as advanced educational training).
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individuals to flourish in economic systems. 5 9 Such networks thrive on
a developed sense of reciprocity, particularly in long-term forms.
60
Speaking more naturalistically, they build on Robert Axelrod's notions
that, in the long term, advantageous survival strategies call for reciprocal
tit-for-tat.' 61 It is not in an individual's self-interest to take advantage of
others in the society, although there is always a temptation to do so if it
can be accomplished without getting caught, 62 but instead to act in ways
that contribute to a network of relationships where certain virtues
become the expected norm of behavior and, in the long run, pay off. Or,
to push the naturalistic evidence further, the notion of generous tit-for-
tat argues that not only should one mirror the actions of others, as
Axelrod suggests, but also, to avoid a degenerative spiral of feud-like
behavior that erodes trust, a point of forgiveness for past actions can
reverse the spiral.
63
Creating conditions that foster Real Confidence thus stresses acting
fairly, and, by doing so, creates social capital so that integrity becomes a
reinforced practice, and moves past a calculative self-interest basis for
trust. This requires rewarding people for doing the right thing. Because
social capital and Real Confidence trade on notions of fairness,
normative considerations must also be present. Thus, corporate
consideration of what is fair would be a necessary part of developing a
culture of ethics and compliance) 64
Several years ago, LaRue Hosmer developed a small vignette based
on the real experience of a recent MBA graduate who worked for a
department store in the gourmet foods section. 165 One of the items the
store sold was individually wrapped and sealed specialty cookies.
159. See id at 319-25.
160. See id. at 18-27.
161. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20-22 (1984).
162. See HAYEK, supra note 153, at 70 (arguing for norms of reciprocity and
integrity virtues such as truth-telling, promise keeping, and protection of contracts and
property but while also recognizing that these virtues require coercive legal (and
religious) enforcement because of the temptation to benefit from others practicing these
virtues while behaving opportunistically whenever one can).
163. See AXELROD, supra note 161, at 54, 176-77.
164. See Trevino et al., supra note 122, at 131 (discussing their empirical studies
that show the importance of treating employees fairly (for example, use of rewards and
punishments, treating employees with respect, dignity, and so on) and following
through on company policies for creating an effective compliance program).
165. LARUE TONE HOSMER, MORAL LEADERSHIP IN BusINEss 86-87 (1994).
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Unfortunately, some customers found bugs crawling around on the
cookies when they opened the packages. The recent graduate's manager
instructed her to "dump" the cookies, but the graduate soon discovered
that this did not mean to throw the cookies in the trash. Instead, the
manager stated that she knew of a convenience store in the inner city
where they could sell the infested cookies at a discount, which would
allow the store to salvage at least some money from the infested
goods. 166
From a twisted perspective, the supervisor's directive made sense
because the manager's annual bonus was based on profitability per
square foot, as was her future allocation of square footage in the store. 67
In short, the company rewarded her to maximize her profitability
through whatever means were available. The manager, who did not
seem to otherwise be an uncaring person, 168 simply followed the logic of
the financial incentives.
One could easily argue that the manager still should not have sold
the cookies. The point, however, is that if an organization wants to be
an ethical one, then it cannot rely on individual managers and employees
to regularly risk sacrificing their own financial well-being and career
potential to make it happen. Instead, the organization must take on this
responsibility. The firm must develop incentives that reward people for
not selling infested cookies and punish them if they do. This means that
ethics is not simply about hiring people with personal integrity; it means
that ethics is also about organizational structures that reward the right
behavior. 169 In other words, to foster integrity, one needs to address
utilitarian considerations in which just treatment of stakeholders is
rewarded so that the greatest good is achieved. Or, to put it in more
conventional business terms, it is important to create win-win
environments for multiple stakeholders. Through this process, social
capital is established, which, in turn, builds Real Confidence and trust
among stakeholders that the firm will treat them fairly.
In addition to providing the right types of rewards and punishments,




169. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
unethical behavior associated with Enron's reward system).
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That is, firms cannot simply hope that employees will embrace an active
notion of corporate citizenship. 70  Instead, encouraging workplace
behavior that goes "beyond the call of duty"'' 7 requires organizations to
act in ways that inspire such aspirational behavior.172 Such a connection
between organizational structure and employee motivation is a critical
feature of the final kind of trust, Good Faith. To inspire individuals to
do more than they are required by duty to do, organizations should aim
to create job satisfaction for employees, to provide good leadership, and
to be perceived as achieving justice within the organization. 73
The task of Good Faith is to foster, or liberate, passion shorn of its
deleterious effects. 174 The aim of Good Faith is not only to engage
personal meaningfulness and to integrate the individual into
communities and causes that transcend oneself, but to do so in way that
remains consistent with Hard Conviction - obeying just laws - and to
build on the moral duties of Real Confidence. Two critical dimensions
comprise Good Faith. The first is a spiritual and aesthetic, harmonic
artfulness that defines a quest for moral excellence. The basic idea is
that through commitment to a powerful good, individuals within the
company can be energized to desire the pursuit of ethical business
behavior in their work. 75 This is consistent with the normative ethical
theory of virtue ethics and its focus, in part, on the quest for excellence
and living "the good life.' 76 Legal scholars studying corporate social
responsibility have long recognized the inability of the law by itself to
170. See Mark C. Bolino & William H. Turnley, Going the Extra Mile: Cultivating
and Managing Employee Citizenship Behavior, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 60
(2003). Bolino and Tumley, of course, are not the only management scholars looking at
such issues, but they do summarize corporate citizenship in a straightforward, helpful
way.
171. Id. at 61.
172. See generally id. at 62-64.
173. Id. at 60-64.
174. See generally id.
175. See generally TIMOTHY L. FORT & CINDY A. SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS
IN FOSTERING PEACEFUL SOCIETIES (2004) (arguing that the goal of sustainable peace is
both a possible aspirational goal as well as something led to by common ethical
business practices).
176. See RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS: INSIGHTS OF
THE ANCIENT GREEKS 5 (2002). For an application of virtue ethics to business life, see
ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN
BUSINESS (1993).
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foster moral excellence in individuals and organizations.171
Social scientists may refer to the concept of Good Faith as an
"intrinsic" motivation, where "there is an inherent satisfaction that is
derived from pursuing the activity.' 78 This is opposed to an "extrinsic"
motivation, where an employee feels compelled to act in a certain way
due to some external force, such as a monitoring and sanctioning
system.179  In many ways, extrinsic motivation crowds out internal
motivation. 18
0
This raises the issue of to what extent an individual is allowed to
bring his or her own values into the organization. Some describe this as
a "role morality" problem, where individuals make decisions on the
corporation's behalf that they would not make on their own.' 81 Part of
the problem is that individuals do not feel responsible for their actions in
large bureaucracies, 182 but also important is that individuals are often
discouraged from using their personal values to critique actions that are
requested of them. 83 This leads to the second dimension of the notion
of Good Faith.
The second dimension is an organizational aspect where there are
communal identities formed which dialectically interact with
individuals. 84 This is a notion of "mediating institutions," which are
particular kinds of communities that foster personal meaningfulness and
moral identity. 85 Mediating institutions have both a descriptive and
177. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 101 (1975); Lynn Sharpe Paine, Law, Ethics and Managerial
Judgment, in A COMPANION TO BUSINESS ETHICS 194, 198 (Robert E. Frederick ed.,
1994) ("There is no legal sanction for failing to be the best we can be or for failing to
make a positive contribution to society").
178. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision
Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 684, 685 (1999).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
AND DEMOCRACY 33 (2002).
182. See generally David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of
Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1992).
183. PARKER, supra note 181, at 33, 294-95.
184. Bolino & Turnley, supra note 170, at 67-68.
185. For a complete discussion of mediating institutions, see TIMOTHY L. FORT,
ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTION (2001).
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normative element. Descriptively, research by anthropologists and
psychologists suggests that human beings are hard-wired to live and
work in relatively small communities.) 6  When organized in
communities that are too large, individuals do not see the consequences
or efficacy of their actions and start to lose concern.18 7 This breaks
down the social capital-type aspects of Real Confidence discussed
above. In smaller groups, however, moral behavior becomes important
in order to sustain relationships. 8 8  For example, in a laboratory
experiment involving a social dilemma game, changing the group size
from three to seven players decreased the level of trust in the group.
189
Likely explanations for the result were lowered expectations that others
would cooperate in the larger group and each individual's view that his
or her actions would have little impact on the group.' 90 Likewise, others
have argued that the optimal group size for making decisions is four to
six members.' 9'
The anthropologist Robin Dunbar has conducted some of the most
extensive research on this topic. 192 As a way to estimate the expected,
natural size of a human group, Dunbar plotted the neocortex ratio of all
primates against the empirical data on the. size of groups the species
naturally organized into.' 93 Based on regression analysis, he estimated
the optimal size of a human group to be 150.194 Dunbar found that this
number resonated with human experience. For example, he discovered
studies that showed the number 150 to be the average number of names
in an individual's address book and the size of a company unit in the
military.' 95 He also found a study done by the Church of England that
attempted to estimate the optimal size of a congregation. To ensure that
186. See id. at 49-51.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. K. Sato, Trust and Group Size in a Social Dilemma, 30 JAPANESE PSYCHOL.
RES. 88, 92-93 (1988).
190. Id.
191. Gregory A. Johnson, Information Sources and the Development of Decision-
making Organizations, in SOCIAL ARCHAEOLOGY: BEYOND SUBSISTENCE AND DATING
87 (Charles L. Redman et al., eds., 1978).
192. ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING GOSSIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
(1996).
193. Id. at 63.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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the congregation would not become so large that people would be
unaware of the joys and concerns of parishioners, the study concluded
that a number less than 200 was optimal. 9 6 Finally, Dunbar noted that
this size is effective in business organizations because the organization
needs to resort less to hierarchical orderings.197
Discussion of such anthropological and psychological data makes
for interesting conversation, but the importance of these numbers
reaches to business ethics as well. This is the normative dimension of
mediating institutions. 98 As noted above, within small groups, people
must consider the consequences of their actions. That does not mean
that they necessarily must like each other - only that their actions
matter because they must get along with others for the group to function.
The normative argument is that human beings have their moral character
formed in relatively small "mediating institutions."' 99  Families,
religious organizations, neighborhoods, and voluntary associations form
moral character, at least in part, because individuals must deal with the
consequences of actions; the groups are small enough and enduring
enough so that one must seriously consider how one's behavior impacts
communal relationships.2"'
196. Id. at 74-76. Continuing the religious examples, he also found historical
evidence that when Brigham Young moved five thousand Mormons from Nauvoo,
Illinois to Salt Lake City, Utah, he divided them into self-coordinating groups of 150
and then managed the leaders of those groups. Dunbar notes that the Hutterites living
in the western part of the United States insist on maintaining community sizes of 150 so
that one does not need to resort to abstract rules to abide by, but instead, can rely on
more informal interactions among the members. Id. at 71-73. Finally, Dunbar states
that at any given time in a person's life, there are probably only 150 people that one
feels closely connected to. Or more colloquially, Dunbar says that there are about 150
people who, if one saw one of them sitting at a bar, one would feel comfortable in just
pulling up a chair and having a beer with them. Id. at 71-73.
197. Id. at 72.
198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
199. See PETER BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
200. These organizations also provide a "double-meaning" to their members. They
provide an internal sense of moral identity within so that one has a sense of belonging.
They also provide an external gateway to the larger world. The way in which they
fulfill this role is complex and has been characterized as simply an enhancement of self-
interest, as socialization groupings that teach individuals to reach beyond self-interest
and consider their citizenship obligation to others, and as naturalistic reactions to an
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That communities have a strong role in inculcating moral values in
individuals is an Aristotelian conception of morality.2 °' That
individuals, in turn, affect the moral character of organizations in
conjunction with the reciprocal experience of being shaped by those
institutions gives rise to a dialectical sense of moral development. 2
Mediating institutions capture this dimension because families,
neighborhoods, voluntary associations, and religious organizations all
shape and are shaped by individual moral development.0 3
Communitarians, such as Amitai Etzioni, also emphasize the importance
of connecting individuals to organizations, but typically they do so by
focusing on mammoth mega-structures such as the nation-state.2 4 Yet,
the anthropological data on the importance of small numbers suggest
that there may be a particular kind of a community - a relatively small
mediating institution - whereby moral character is optimally
developed.0 5 In short, a central dilemma for contemporary normative
behavior is matching where people learn about ethics to where they are
practiced in a way to foster a sentiment of caring about moral
behavior.20 6
urban world in terms of dysfunctional, anti-social groups (inner city youth gangs and
rural militias) that provide identity against the outside world. In this last respect, the
organizations might be more aptly called quarantining institutions rather than mediating
institutions, because they discourage a mediated, constructed response to the outside
world in favor of an exclusivist, confrontational and/or withdrawing relationship to the
world. Phrased descriptively, human beings do seem to naturally group themselves.
Phrased normatively, for human beings to group themselves in a way that is socially
engaged, the institutions must mediate the relationship between the individual and the
outside world rather than quarantine the individual from constructive relationship with
it. See generally id. See also ALEXIS DETOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
VOLUME 2 (Phillips Bradley, ed., 1945).
201. See FORT, supra note 185, at 43.
202. See ERROL E. HARRIS, FORMAL, TRANSCENDENTAL, AND DIALECTICAL LOGIC:
LOGIC AND REALITY (1987).
203. Id.; see also BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 199.
204. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE (1996). See also
Timothy L. Fort, On Golden Rules, Balancing Acts, and Finding the Right Size, 8 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 346 (1998) (critiquing Etzioni).
205. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits
"Just Right", 23 IOwA J. CORP. L. 245, 264-67 (1998).
206. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1981) (arguing that a classic feature of modernity is that it asks individuals
only to do the particular role asked of them rather than to ask overarching questions
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The point is that fostering an affective culture of ethical behavior
can be promoted by matching organizational dimensions, such as, but
not limited to, sizing of groupings within organizations, while attending
to negative dimensions that are associated with them. Thus, small
groups within corporations may build a commitment of trust by
clarifying to members of the group that their actions make a difference
to others.
B. The Management Challenge
By requiring firms to build an ethical culture, the Guidelines are
moving away from an approach that judges the effectiveness of
programs based on easily auditable features.20 7 Instead, it calls for an
approach that is social science-based and integrates the three notions of
trust described above. The challenge for management is finding the
right balance of these notions of trust. For example, Hard Conviction is
necessary to support notions of organizational justice (that is, that
employees are conspicuously punished for their wrongful behavior), but
the trust developed through Real Confidence is also necessary to ensure
that employees understand why such punishment is occurring and to be
accepting of it.20 8 Too much control through monitoring and punishment
can lead to distrust, however, as well as to a reduction in intrinsic
motivations (and the notion of Good Faith).20 9  For example, one
laboratory study of a social dilemma game found that improperly
designed sanctions for wrongful behavior actually led to less
cooperation (and a lowered expectation that others would cooperate)
about the legitimacy of the activity).
207. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2004).
208. See TREvINo and WEAVER, supra note 120, at 212 ("When a values orientation
is strong, compliance activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of support
for ethical behavior"). In one study, Trevino and Weaver found that an effective
whistle-blowing program (i.e., the reporting of unethical behavior to top management)
required both Hard Conviction (employees seeking that justice takes place in their
organization through the punishment of wrongdoers) and Real Confidence (trust that
management will protect the whistleblower from retaliation and use the information
appropriately). See id. at 201-02.
209. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 178, at 685. Improperly designed
sanctioning systems (or Hard Conviction) may have the effect of increasing wrongful
behavior, as employees no longer take responsibility for actions. Id.
758 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
than the same social dilemma without any sanctions.10
The presence of a control system in an organization can also
influence how an employee views (or frames) a problem, which then
shapes his or her subsequent response.2 ' In some social dilemma
games, an individual facing punishment for wrongful behavior will
frame the dilemma in a way that is different from an individual who
does not face such punishments. For example, the first individual may
frame the dilemma as a "business situation" involving cost-benefit trade-
offs, while the second individual (who does not face a potential
punishment) may frame the dilemma as an ethical issue, which raises
different issues for consideration and requires that individual to reflect
on his or her values. 12
C. The Role of the Law in Promoting Hard Conviction, Real Confidence,
and Good Faith
The challenge the Guidelines have assumed is how to build trust
within organizations. Typically, the law works by forcing structures and
rules upon organizations. However, requiring firms to force compliance
programs upon their employees runs the risk of developing distrust and
working against the development of compliant and ethical organizations.
The Guidelines attempt to walk this balance by requiring certain "best
practices," while still leaving firms with flexibility in implementing
compliance programs. This section takes an initial look at just a few of
the ways the Guidelines can support the three notions of trust discussed
above.21 3
C. 1. The Expressive Function of the Law
One way to view how the law can support the development of trust
through compliance programs is by viewing the new Guidelines as
serving an "expressive" or "framing" function.21 4 Viewed in this way,
210. Id. at 695-96.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 696, 702.
213. See supra notes 133-39, 152-54, 170-72 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Robert Cooter, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law: A Conference Sponsored by the University of Chicago Law School and
the John M Olin Program In Law and Economics: Expressive Law and Economics, 27
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the new Guidelines operate not by threat of punishment for those firms
that do not adopt the appropriate compliance program, but by the
Guidelines' creation of awareness about an appropriate compliance
program and the need for an ethical corporate culture. For example, in
one laboratory study, psychologists had two groups of subjects play a
version of the prisoner's dilemma game.215 In this game, the players
could either cooperate and seek joint gains with their partner, or they
could defect and seek their highest personal gain without concern for the
other player. When the subjects were told beforehand that they were
playing the "community game," there was more than twice the level of
cooperation than when the subjects were told they were playing the
"Wall Street game."216 The manipulation in the name of the game was
found to be more important than an individual's character in determining
cooperation. 217  This simple experiment demonstrates the potential
power of the expressive function of law.218
Eisenberg provides a real world example of these ideas from the
duty of care in corporate law.219  He argued that, during the 1990s,
J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Legal Construction Of Norms: A
Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996). For a more general background see COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME
THEORY (2003); CHOICES, VALUES, & FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000).
215. Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social
Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1099-
1100 (2003).
216. See id. For a similar finding, see Richard P. Larrick & Sally Blount, The
Claiming Effect: Why Players are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in
Ultimatum Games, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 810 (1997) (finding that the
verbs used in describing a subject's actions in a study involving the ultimatum game
changed how the individuals framed the game, which changed their willingness to
cooperate (i.e., accept or offer fair distributions)).
217. Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 215, at 1099-1100. The researchers
determined an individual's character by the perceptions of others on whether or not that
person was likely to cooperate. Id.
218. Using the law to manipulate social norms to develop trust can also have
unintended consequences or actually work to reduce trust. See generally Ribstein,
supra note 139.
219. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
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corporate directors began to take their duty of care more seriously.
Rather than simply rubber-stamping the decisions of CEOs, directors
became more active in setting the board's agenda and critically
evaluating the performance of the CEO. Directors did not increase their
vigilance due to a fear of increased liability, because that fear was
reduced by state laws that allowed corporations to eliminate director
liability for breaches of the duty of care.220 Instead, Eisenberg argued
that the reason for the change was "a shift in the social norm governing
directorial duties, from a non-obligational practice norm that insulated
inactive directors from criticism and self-criticism, to an obligational
norm that requires a higher level of care."22 ' This occurred from a
"change in the belief-system of the business community" with respect to
the role of directors.222
The main cause of this change in social norms was the law.223
Although directors were essentially shielded from liability (due also to
the business judgment rule),224 the courts continued to define directors'
obligations and how directors should "play" their roles. 22' Thus, the law
can provide essential meaning for how actors are to perform in these
situations. In addition, the law creates social norms that can be enforced
by social sanctions. For example, "no smoking" signs are rarely
enforced by legal sanctions, 226 but their presence allows others to
"enforce" the smoking bans by "dirty looks" or "harsh words." With
respect to compliance programs, the new Guidelines work towards
creating new social norms that indicate that "paper" compliance
1253 (1999).
220. Id. at 1267-68.
221. Id. at 1268-69.
222. Id. at 1269.
223. For a similar line of analysis, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009 (1997).
224. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1470 (2006).
225. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that... state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."); U.S. Cent.
Underwriters Agency, Inc. v. Hutchings, 952 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that corporations in essence are creatures of statute. As such, statutory law primarily
defines the powers and duties of corporate officers and directors).
226. Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IowA L. REV.
35, 46-47 (2002) (summarizing a study discussed in Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1720 (2000)).
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programs are not satisfactory,227 and that all levels of management
(including the board) must be involved in ethics and compliance
training, among other related responsibilities. 228 This allows those,
within (and outside) the organization, who support meaningful
compliance programs, the standing and legitimacy to demand such
changes if they are not being made. Perhaps more importantly, it helps
reshape directors' and officers' views of compliance programs.
Currently, these programs are simply viewed as risk-management
tools. 229 If the law can change those views - and reconnect ethics and
compliance programs with being a good corporate citizen - then there
will be a significant impact on how these programs are implemented.
Over time, these norms should become institutionalized, and, it is
hoped, will lead to more proactive compliance and ethics programs.
This is supported by the research of management scholars which shows
that changing the norms of appropriate behavior among officers and
directors will have stronger impact on the effectiveness of compliance
programs than coercive, external pressures. 230 Even the new Guidelines'
discussion of an ethical organizational culture 3 1 could create new social
norms and likely lead firms to engage with new consultants and utilize
227. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 62.
228. See supra Part I B; see also ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 61-62; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8b2.1 (2004).
229. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (noting the moral hazard
problem identified by Laufer).
230. TREVINO and WEAVER, supra note 120, at 117-18, 141; Gary R. Weaver et al.,
Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management Values,
External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42 ACADEMY OF MGMT. J. 539
(1999); Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems:
Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors, 42 ACADEMY OF
MGMT. J. 41 (1999). For example, one study by Trevino and Weaver found that
management commitment to ethics (measured by the frequency that top management
discussed ethics related topics) was positively related to an ethics program that was
integrated into the firm's operations. TREVINO and WEAVER, supra note 120, at 137-44.'
Although awareness of the guidelines also had a positive impact on the adoption of
more integrated ethics programs, it had significantly less influence than management's
commitment to ethics. TREVINO and WEAVER, supra note 120, at 144. The empirical
question then is whether the changes in the content of the guidelines, which will require
top management to discuss issues related to developing an ethical culture, will lead to
more integrated ethics programs.
231. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8.
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their Human Resources departments (instead of exclusively their legal
departments).,32 These changes, along with those that emphasize
rewarding ethical behavior and motivating employees to follow the
compliance program, support the idea of establishing Real Confidence.
C.2. Insigahts from Mediating Institutions
The Guidelines can also support the mediating institutions insights
into building Good Faith. For example, the new Guidelines require
firms to conduct "effective training programs. 233 The Advisory Report
indicates that an "effective" program does not simply educate employees
about compliance but also motivates them to comply. 234  As the
Committee notes in the Advisory Report, most transgressions are not
due to ignorance, but to those "who may too readily yield to temptation
or pressure to break the rules. 235 Although the Committee does not
specify the form of training required, because it wanted to give firms
flexibility based on their size and the nature of compliance risks they
face, there is some indication that web-based training programs may not
be sufficient.236 The burden is on the firm to show that it believed its
training to be effective. During the hearings, various experts debated the
use of small-group training versus web-based training. Consistent with
the idea of mediating institutions, one expert argued for small-group
training "so people who are not aware of [the firm's] values have an
opportunity to see that other people have those values and maybe they
need to rethink where they are.,
2 37
In large group or web-based training programs, employees are
typically passive learners that are not actively engaged in shaping the
values of the organization or of their smaller work groups.238 Based on
the studies cited earlier, without a sense that their actions will make a
232. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
233. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
234. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 70.
235. Id. at 71 (quoting Joseph Murphy, Partner, Compliance Systems Legal Group
(internal citations omitted)).
236. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 24, at 71.
237. Public Hearing Before the US. Sentencing Comm 'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 72-73 (Nov. 14, 2002) (testimony of Carole
Basri, Executive Director, American Corporate Counsel Association of Greater New
York), http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phl I_02/BRKOUT2.pdf.
238. See generally supra notes 24, 133 and accompanying text.
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difference, employees will be less likely to cooperate (lowering Real
Confidence in the organization as well as the intrinsic Good Faith
motivation to act). 9 Moreover, these training programs often focus
simply on learning the company's "correct" answer to a problem, rather
than an open discussion of real ethical issues faced by employees and
what values should guide the resolution of those dilemmas. By contrast,
in the 1990s, Lockheed Martin gained significant attention for their
innovative ethics program that seemed to adopt some of the insights of a
mediating institutions approach. Part of their training program involved
a board game (using the cartoon character Dilbert) that was conducted in
small groups, that was led by the employees' supervisor (as opposed to
an outside consultant), and that utilized open-ended discussion
questions.240  The role of the law is to encourage firms to adopt
structures that support mediating institutions and to spread best practices
between organizations. Organizations must be encouraged to record
their best practices and attempt to measure the impact of their training
methods. In addition, the Guidelines should rely on and encourage
additional research by management and business ethics scholars to
identify effective training practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, seeking effective compliance and ethics programs would
be further enhanced by an authentic symbiotic corporate governance
strategy that integrates the need for law, the social capital kinds of
rewards that institutionalize societal norms (expressed through laws,
financial markets, and non-financial markets), and structuring
organizations to coincide with our innate, naturalistic predispositions.
This paper is a step in the direction of showing how such a symbiotic
integration is now both legally mandated as well as a potentially fruitful
exercise of interdisciplinary academic inquiry. Thus, Hard Conviction,
as defined here,24' is an important step in that it insists on proper
corporate behavior. But, as the 2004 Amendments implicitly recognize,
there must be an integration of law with other dimensions. Real
239. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
240. Samuel Greengard, Lockheed Martin is Game for Ethics, WORKFORCE, Oct.
1997, at 51.
241. See supra notes 137-39.
764 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
Confidence emphasizes that the building of reliability and trust in an
organization, through the practicing of normative behavior and the
building of social capital, is important for the building of an ethical
culture with an attitude toward achieving good citizenship. In addition,
fostering the passion for ethics through Good Faith, by connecting our
biological capabilities to our organizational structure, completes a tri-
partite integration of corporate responsibility.
If the 2004 Amendments are a call to anything, they are a challenge
to scholars in various fields to symbiotically synthesize their models.
Legal scholars, management social scientists, normative philosophers,
psychologists, and theologians have an opportunity - indeed
corporations may have a legal necessity - to see these disciplines
integrate their work in order to comply with the new Guidelines. The
challenge we face is in finding the appropriate role for legal mandates in
encouraging organizations to comply with the law - not just the letter
of the law but the spirit of the law. The Commission enacted the new
Guidelines both to solve the problem of cosmetic compliance programs
and to encourage firms to adopt certain best practices. We believe that
the Guidelines can serve an additional, broader purpose - that is,
supporting the components of trust we identified as Hard Conviction,
Real Confidence, and Good Faith.
